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National Competition Policy:  Some Issues 
Fred Argy  
I ntroduced as part of the Hilmer reforms of 1995, national competition policy (NCP) is a cooperative Federal-State attempt to broaden the scope of competition and develop a more coordinated approach to reform.  The main 
provisions are set out in the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA). 
Some competition reforms were already in place before NCP was introduced.  
For example a few individual governments had earlier opened up infrastructure 
monopolies such as gas, electricity, water and transport to wider competition.  The 
NCP framework took these reforms under its wing and embraced many new 
initiatives which sought to: 
 
• extend the Trade Practices laws to certain government-owned and private 
businesses previously exempt;  
• promote competitive neutrality between private and government-owned 
businesses; 
• encourage governments to undertake systematic reviews of all anti-
competitive elements in existing legislation; and 
• ensure reasonable access by competing businesses to core monopoly 
controlled infrastructure such as electricity cables, railway lines, gas pipelines 
and airports.   
 
The broad principle underlying NCP is that restrictions on competition should 
be removed unless they can be shown to be in the public interest.  The National 
Competition Council (NCC) has been given the role of advising the Federal 
Treasurer on whether the aims of the reform program are being met and if not, 
whether special Commonwealth revenue grants (‘competition’ or ‘bonus’ 
payments) should be withheld.   
Concerns have been expressed about the competition reform program on 
three main grounds:  
 
• it does not allow state authorities adequate discretion in relation to policy 
development, review and pace of implementation;  
• its effective contribution to economic efficiency is small; and 
• it gives too much weight to efficiency relative to other societal goals.   
 
The main aim of this paper is to examine critically these concerns.   
                                                     
 Fred Argy is a former government policy adviser and currently a Visiting Fellow at the 
ANU and Adjunct Professor, University of Queensland. 
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Democratic Legitimacy of NCP Processes 
Some critics (for example Quiggin, 1998:16-17) say that NCP allows the state 
governments too little discretion in pursuing their own social priorities and that 
processes of consultation and implementation are inadequate.  They therefore 
question its democratic legitimacy.  There are several strands to this concern. 
First, some critics allege that only limited consultation occurred when the 
policies were first formulated.  This claim is not explored further in this paper.  
Second, it is argued that NCP arrangements do not allow individual governments 
enough political flexibility to trade-off some efficiency for other values in 
response to community preferences.  This is an important issue; it is discussed 
later in the paper.  A third strand is that non-elected officials and advisers have 
excessive influence relative to state politicians.  This concern relates to the 
powerful role played by the NCC in monitoring the reforms and advising the 
Federal Treasurer.  Finally it is argued that states rights are being infringed by 
giving the Commonwealth Government powers to impose financial penalties on 
the states when it is dissatisfied with the results.   
The need for State Governments to have a bigger say in the policy 
development process was recognised by federal and state ministers at their 
November 2000 meeting.  They agreed on a number of changes designed to 
enhance the opportunity for states to make their case where the NCC recommends 
a penalty and before the final decision is made on competition payments  (Banks, 
2001:13).  State authorities are still required to document their public interest 
reasons and to ensure that the outcome is within a range which ‘a properly 
constituted review’ might consider ‘reasonable’ on the information available to it.  
But they are being allowed more discretion in determining whether existing 
practices are in the public interest.   
To go further and totally abolish the right of the Federal Government to 
withhold competition payments — remove altogether the element of incentive (as 
proposed by some, for example Quiggin, 1998) — would leave NCP without a 
framework to ensure that the rules of the game are observed.  It would weaken 
confidence in the transparency, independence and objectivity, and hence the 
consistency and integrity, of public interest assessments.   
On the other hand, it is equally untenable to argue that the role of the states 
needs to be substantially reduced in order to speed up the process of reform 
(Harman and Harman, 1996:2).  Such critics overlook the extreme difficulties of 
winning political cooperation and support without allowing states discretion on 
how best to achieve agreed outcomes (Keating and Wanna, 2000:139). 
NCP and Economic Efficiency 
Some economists believe that reforms like NCP make little or no contribution to 
economic efficiency.  This criticism is discussed here firstly at the theoretical level 
and then by specific reference to NCP. 
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Theory 
A reform improves economic efficiency if winners are capable of compensating 
the losers and still remain better off.  (A more restrictive concept of efficiency 
requires that winners actually compensate losers but policy-making would be 
paralysed if it always had to strive for win/win outcomes.).  A recent survey of 
economists found an overwhelming majority was of the view that pro-competition 
policies will tend to improve economic efficiency (Argy, 2001).  Such consensus 
is rare in economics.  It stems from a belief that competitive markets give 
consumers wider choice and lower prices and give sellers stronger incentives to: 
 
• minimise their costs and cut out waste (thus making less calls on national 
productive resources to produce any given output); 
• innovate and adapt quickly to changing circumstances;  
• pass on cost reductions to consumers and target their specific preferences; 
and 
• channel goods and services to those consumers who value them most highly. 
 
However economists are also aware of three ‘traps’ in the theory.  First, free 
markets do not always work perfectly.  There may be information asymmetries, 
high transaction costs involved in collecting and evaluating information, learning 
curves, herd mentality affecting buyers and sellers, and so on.  More importantly 
from the viewpoint of this paper, the market may not be able to sustain several 
producers if there are potentially large economies of scale and natural barriers to 
entry.  In such circumstances competitive markets may not be viable in the long 
term and can lead to a concentration of private market power.  This would in turn 
require extensive regulation and would not necessarily produce good efficiency 
outcomes.   
Second, unleashing the forces of competition across the economy may entail 
economic adjustment costs in the short term and these costs need to be set against 
long term efficiency gains.  For example, many unskilled workers displaced by 
structural change and reform remain unemployed for fairly long periods and suffer 
severe personal costs (Borland and McDonald, 2000).   
Third, competitive markets may not produce efficient outcomes in the long 
term if there are ‘negative externalities’, that is, adverse economic welfare 
consequences not fully accounted for in the price and market system.  Such 
externalities can occur, for example, if the competitive process leads to erosion of 
a country’s natural capital or increased traffic congestion and airport noise or 
increased job insecurity and stress.   
Even the most enthusiastic supporters of competition policy acknowledge that 
if market imperfections, adjustment costs and negative externalities are large 
enough and are ignored, they can conceivably leave little or nothing by way of net 
efficiency gain.   
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Potential efficiency gains from NCP 
NCP is essentially a mechanism for freeing up markets and facilitating greater 
competition.  How well does it deal with the three ‘traps’ outlined above? 
Some public service or utility markets targeted by NCP operate in imperfect 
markets.  They may not lend themselves to additional competition, either because 
of economies of scale (as with core networks) or because of the high costs of 
collecting and evaluating information (as with health and education).  But such 
imperfections are only found in a few of the markets subject to NCP and can be 
separately accommodated, for example, through price and access regulation (Fels, 
2001), without abandoning the whole reform program.   
Implementation of NCP is also likely to involve significant adjustment costs 
on the way.  For example, the Productivity Commission (1999:250) acknowledges 
that, although in the long run there should be positive employment effects through 
price reductions and real income increases, ‘the early direct effects of NCP 
reforms on employment have been adverse’.  Victoria’s Latrobe Valley suffered 
sustained job losses as a result of electricity reform, although employment levels 
in the Valley region are now tending to recover significantly.   
While short term employment disruption is unavoidable as NCP begins to 
bite, good governance can ensure that it does not lead to long term, structural 
unemployment — an issue the paper returns to later.   
There are also transitional costs stemming from water reform, for example, 
the lack of success in addressing water property rights is eroding security for 
farmers in financial negotiations.  Again, such costs can be minimised with 
appropriate policy action.  Similarly, any negative externalities generated by NCP 
can in general be prevented or offset without destroying the basic efficiency 
rationale of the reform program.   
For example, Hamilton and Denniss (2000) warn that the application of 
competition policy to the electricity sector could, by encouraging more electricity 
production, add substantially to the combustion of carbon-based fossil fuels and 
greenhouse gas emissions.  However, the problem here lies not with competition 
policy per se but with environment, energy and utility pricing policies.  For 
example, the price of electricity could incorporate a special carbon charge to 
ensure it is not below the socially optimal (and consumption is not above optimal).  
Or the tax system could be restructured so as to encourage a shift from coal-fired 
to gas-based fuels and so reduce the ‘carbon dioxide intensity’ of electricity 
generation.  More generally, a balanced national energy policy could be 
implemented in conjunction with NCP.  A review of the energy market 
foreshadowed by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is to include 
greenhouse emissions in its terms of reference.  Limited steps are also being taken 
to facilitate the trading of emission credits.   
In any case the environmental externalities generated by competition policy 
are not all negative.  For example, cost minimisation in electricity reduces demand 
for natural resources per unit of output.  Similarly, water reforms, such as the 
application of fuller cost pricing to water use, the allocation of clear rights to use 
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of water and the introduction of tradeable allocations of water rights, are likely to 
prove favourable for the natural environment, and especially our river systems.  
Again, the wider choices offered by NCP should make it easier for buyers to 
purchase ‘green’ energy from renewable sources like natural gas.   
On a different plane, it has been argued that reforms like NCP which tend to 
intensify the competitive environment can put pressure on firms not to exceed 
legally required safety standards and working conditions and to demand more of 
their workers.  The market liberalisation reforms of the 80's and 90's have been 
associated with a rise in casuals, more widespread job insecurity and increased 
work intensity and stress, as well as higher structural unemployment.  The 
evidence of deterioration in workers' quality of life is now quite extensive (for 
example, see ACIRRT 2001; Pocock 2001; Kelley Evans and Dawkins, 1998), 
although it is still subject to debate (Murthough and Waite, 2000; Wooden, 1999).  
Being based on opinion surveys, the evidence is perceptual in character.  But 
perceptions are important in such cases.   
The potential efficiency costs of such effects on workers are far from 
insignificant.  For example, when asked, typical low-income workers say that they 
would be happy to earn one third less to move from an insecure to a secure job 
(Kelley and Evans, forthcoming).  If governments are concerned (as they should 
be) about what is happening to the quality of life of workers, it does not mean they 
have to walk away from competition reform.  They can continue to implement 
reform and then neutralise some of its undesirable effects by other more direct 
means such as establishing minimum economy-wide workplace standards.   
In short, market imperfections and failure do not per se destroy the efficiency 
rationale of competition policy.  However they have a message for policy-makers.  
The efficiency benefits of competition reforms like NCP cannot be taken for 
granted; they must be assessed on a case by case basis and the reforms often need 
to be supplemented by other policies.  Sometimes the externalities are so complex 
and difficult to anticipate and control that they are best handled under a regulated 
public monopoly (Argy et al., 1999; King and Pitchford, 1998). 
Actual NCP efficiency returns 
It is difficult to evaluate the actual impact of NCP on efficiency and costs.  For 
one thing, implementation has progressed more slowly than expected.  Rail reform 
is lagging and there has been some slippage in achieving a national gas and 
electricity market and in reviewing anti-competitive practices in the previously 
exempt private sector.  The slow pace of reform reflects the sheer technical 
complexity and ambitious cope of the exercise, but it also stems from community 
and political concerns about the pace of change.  Whatever the causes, NCP 
remains an unfinished project. 
Many analysts point to big reductions in prices of gas and electricity for large 
users (Willett, 2001) and to other benefits such as lower conveyance fees, savings 
in water usage and reduced duplication (NCP, 1999:9).  Some also argue that for 
most electricity customers the incidence of supply interruption has been reduced.  
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However, some of the initial efficiency gains from NCP may not be 
sustained.  Initially, electricity prices fell but this was partly because the industry 
was deregulated at a time of excess capacity.  With this excess capacity eroding, 
and little or no generating reserve capacity to draw on, the expectation now is that 
retail electricity prices will rise appreciably in the near future — at least until new 
capacity comes on stream.  Although the recent world wide downturn in demand 
for energy and falling oil prices may be fortuitous in easing the transition, the 
electricity reforms are about to be tested to the full.   
Longer term, there are doubts about the competitive structure of the industry.  
‘High regional pool prices could indicate that the generation market is too thin and 
that individual generators have substantial market power … the market is not 
currently working as well as it should’ (Willett, 2001).  The NCC attributes this to 
inadequate inter-regional competition, a cumbersome regulatory framework and 
inadequate competition between generators.  The challenge for regulators will be 
to reduce monopoly power and excess profits and yet ensure adequate incentives 
for private electricity operators to invest in new transmission links.  Fortunately, 
Australia does not face the same fundamental problems as in California, where 
wholesale prices were freed while retail prices were frozen.  Australian authorities 
are aware of the need for regulated prices to be regularly and flexibly adjusted.  
Clearly, the original form envisaged for the national electricity market will 
require some modification.  In the meantime, Queensland (unlike other states) has 
decided not to proceed with retail contestability. 
Despite all these transitional and structural difficulties, most economists are 
confident that NCP will appreciably improve efficiency in the long term.  Various 
independent reports (cited by Willett, 2001; and Banks 2001:3-4) have estimated 
that the electricity reforms will improve GDP by several billions of dollars.  These 
projections are consistent with Australia's own past experience with 
microeconomic reform.  In the decade of the 1990’s, Australia's multi-factor 
productivity growth was double the rate in the preceding decade and a half and 0.8 
percentage points higher than the OECD average, whereas it was below or equal 
to OECD in the two previous decades.  These productivity gains partly reflect 
cyclical recovery effects that some analysts believe to be dominant (Quiggin, 
2001).  However most economists see evidence of a decisive improvement in 
productivity trend (Dowrick, 2001) and, while they attribute some of the gains to 
improvements in technology and human capital and better macroeconomic 
management, they assign a major role to the microeconomic reforms of the 80's 
and 90's.  Many of these reforms (for example, tariff reductions, deregulation of 
financial services, transport and communications and contracting out in the public 
sector) had as their principal intent to increase competition.   
Model-based estimates are fraught with uncertainty and the precise numbers 
they churn up cannot be taken seriously; but the broad impressions they convey 
are in line with what one might theoretically expect.  Apart from widening 
consumer choice and giving sellers the right sorts of incentives, NCP is likely to 
have a positive disciplining effect on state governments by instilling in them ‘ a 
culture of rigorous justification of the need for and design of new business 
National Competition Policy:  Some Issues 39
regulation’ (NCC, 2001:Foreword).  In short, while the results so far are patchy 
and uncertain, NCP can reasonably be expected to yield important efficiency 
benefits in the longer term.   
Consistency of NCP rules 
If efficiency is the main aim of NCP, then it needs to be applied consistently.  
Anti-competitive practices by, say, pharmacists, newsagents and some 
professionals have not been subjected to the same rigorous cost-benefit evaluation 
on public interest criteria as other restrictive practices.  Political sheltering erodes 
the integrity and even-handedness of the system.   
Equity as an Important Dimension of Community Well Being 
A gain in economic efficiency is basically value-free.  It simply widens the 
choices available to the community.  The community can use the benefits to 
increase consumption of goods and services or for other purposes such as extend 
leisure, improve the quality of life and restore the environment.  Whatever a 
nation’s values and goals, these can be achieved better if national resources are 
used and allocated efficiently.  So if NCP enhances efficiency it also has the 
potential to increase community well-being (social welfare).  However realisation 
of this potential will depend on how the benefits and costs are distributed.   
Although economists are taught not to make interpersonal utility 
comparisons, value judgments in policy formulation are inevitable.  The so called 
‘neutral’ assumption that everyone has the same marginal utility (which is the 
implicit premise when a reform is assessed exclusively in terms of aggregate GDP 
outcomes) is itself fraught with value judgments.   
If value judgments are inevitable, governments should try to reflect 
predominant values as far as possible.  These values are not easy to determine but 
opinion surveys point to three pertinent conclusions.  First, most Australians seem 
prepared to sacrifice some economic growth in order to achieve less inequality 
(Kelly, 2000:230).  Second, Australians seem prepared to pay higher taxes in 
exchange for better government services that promote equal opportunity (Withers 
and Edwards, 2001; Kelley and Evans, 2001).  Third, a person's perceived well 
being seems to depend at least as much on changes in relative income and quality 
of life as on absolute changes (see Oswald, 1997; Frank, 1997). 
Prima facie this suggests that, to ensure efficiency benefits are translated into 
community wellbeing, low income people should ideally share (at least in part) in 
the incremental benefits of reform — and not just over the ‘long term’. 
It is unlikely that NCP has had much impact on distribution so far.  But it 
does have the potential to do so increasingly in the future.  Some of the effects will 
be socially progressive.  Increased competition in the utilities and professions 
should tend to reduce incomes inequality by breaking down market power, forcing 
prices to fall in line with productivity improvements and eroding privileged 
positions.  A study by the Productivity Commission has found that ‘productivity 
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gains at the industry level have predominantly been passed on in the form of lower 
prices.  This is particularly true of the 1990's, suggesting that stronger competitive 
pressures have been at work’ (Parham et al., 2000:xiv).  The widespread use of 
utilities like electricity and gas means that lower prices are of special value to 
poorer households.   
However there is a risk that, in the absence of active policy intervention, the 
regressive effects will outweigh the progressive effects.  A more competitive 
environment almost by definition favours strong, well endowed, adaptable and 
competitive people and hampers those most vulnerable to change.  The evidence 
(Katz, 1998:33-8; OECD, 2001:Table 2-1) appears to bear this out — across 
countries, there was a tendency for earnings inequality (before taxes and transfers) 
to widen in the late 80's and 90's in response to market liberalisation reforms.   
In Australia too the increased pace of change, deregulation and liberalisation 
in the 80's and 90's appear to have led to an increase in earnings dispersion, with 
lower paid workers falling behind (Parham et al., 2000:135-6).  But Australian 
governments recognised this danger and took measures through social security 
payments, the progressive tax system and ‘social wage’ (that is, non-cash benefits) 
to offset the increase in market inequality (Harding, 2001; Saunders, 2001).  As a 
result, net incomes inequality, conventionally measured, did not significantly 
increase over the last two decades.  But without on-going government intervention 
(both passive and social assistance) inequality would certainly have increased, as 
it did in many other reformist countries such as the UK, NZ and the US.   
Similarly, competition policy can increase regional inequality.  A more 
competitive environment creates incentives to centralise costs and roll back 
uneconomic services, thus affecting the smaller regions.  A study covering the 
period 1986 and 1996 found ‘dramatic increases in regional inequality’ especially 
between states and post codes within states (NATSEM, 2000:2).  A more recent 
study suggests that, at a national level, regional inequality has stopped increasing 
in recent years, probably reflecting falling unemployment and rising farm incomes 
(Harding, 2001).  The Productivity Commission (1999:257) believes that most 
statistical regional divisions will be positive winners from the major NCP reforms 
relating to utilities (also see Banks, 2001:6), but there are likely to be transitional 
and even sustained adverse effects on smaller specialised geographic regions. 
If governments believed that a particular reform would hurt particular 
sections of the community and wanted to prevent or temper this effect, they could 
take offsetting action either ex ante or ex post.  In the case of NCP, one way — 
but as we will argue not necessarily the best way — would be to use the Public 
Interest mechanism to justify retention of the restrictions on competition.   
Deficiencies in the Public Interest Test  
The Public Interest Test (PIT) is set out in clause 1(3) of the Competition 
Principles Agreement.  It requires governments to take into account not only the 
effects of NCP on economic efficiency (such as competitiveness of Australian 
industry, efficient allocation of resources and economic development) but also  
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• ecological sustainability;  
• social welfare and equity, including community service obligations;  
• compliance with prescribed standards on occupational health and safety, 
wages and working conditions; 
• reasonable equality of access to essential services; and  
• regional development.  
 
Nor is this clause meant to be exclusive.  It is open to governments to take 
account of matters not specifically listed in the clause ‘such as the impact on 
specific communities, including adjustment costs’ (Samuel, 2001:4).  As well, 
critics of NCP are frequently reminded that the Agreement, although it does 
require competitive neutrality, does not insist on privatisation of government 
assets, nor does it insist on compulsory competitive tendering and contracting out.   
The NCC therefore believes the PIT offers an adequate safeguard against 
over-preoccupation with efficiency relative to other societal goals.  It argues that 
‘the NCP agreements give social and environmental values no less weight than 
financial considerations in determining where the public interest lies. … All public 
interest considerations intrinsically carry equal weight’ (NCC, 1999:20).  But 
critics are not satsfied.  Quiggin (1998:8) argues that ‘NCP differs from earlier 
attempts to promote competition by virtue of the assumption that competition is 
always and everywhere desirable and that where competition is in conflict with 
other values, there should be a presumption in favour of competition’.   
This may over-state the weight given by NCP to competition but it raises a 
legitimate concern.  Despite the broad ranging character of the PIT and the large 
discretion on social policy allowed individual governments, there are doubts about 
the effectiveness of the Test in establishing an acceptable balance between 
efficiency and equity.  These doubts arise from two features of the PIT.   
First, the onus lies with opponents of reform to prove, through rigorous and 
independent public interest reviews, that existing restrictions on competition are in 
the public interest.  The NCP framework presumes that competition serves the 
public interest unless it can be shown otherwise — that is, that ‘competitive 
outcomes deliver greater benefits than non-competitive outcomes in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary’ (Samuel, 2001:3).  This approach is not the usual 
practice with economic reform.  Normally it is up to reform proponents (including 
the Productivity Commission) to show that a particular change will be worthwhile.  
By assuming that existing restrictions on competition are against the public 
interest unless shown not to be, NCP is an exception to this rule.  True, the Trade 
Practices Act uses an approach similar to the NCP’s to deal with anti-competitive 
conduct.  But in that case the aim is to curb the abuse of private monopoly power 
for private purposes — whereas in the NCP’s case it is to curb the potential for 
abuse of political power.  The two cases are qualitatively different. 
The Chairman of the Productivity Commission, Gary Banks, has noted 
another feature of the PIT which may compound the bias in favour of competition 
and efficiency.  In a recent talk, he warned of the ‘danger that only the measurable 
(what can be easily quantified or valued) will be influential in decision-making’.  
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Since effects on distribution, the environment or quality of life are not easily 
measured, quantified and demonstrated through ‘rigorous, independent reviews’ 
(as required by the Agreement), such values will tend to start with a disadvantage 
relative to productive efficiency (usually measured by GDP per hour or per head).  
More generally, Banks disputes the view that social and environmental 
considerations carry ‘equal weight’ with other public interest criteria.  ‘This could 
be misconstrued as them having equal importance in all cases.  It may be better to 
describe the criteria as having equal status’ (Banks, 2001:9).   
The effect of these features of the PIT is to give proponents of competition 
reform an advantage over opponents.  If this is a concern to governments, there are 
a number of possible policy responses.  They are discussed in the next section.   
Possible Policy Responses  
The President of the NCC, Graeme Samuel (2001:8), accepts that governments 
have a responsibility to ‘ensure the benefits (of competition policy) are shared 
equitably’.  He also believes that ‘to date governments have responded poorly to 
this responsibility’.  There are three ways to more effectively meet this 
responsibility. 
The ‘reform dilution’ approach 
The first would be to try to amend the Public Interest Test provided in the 
Agreement so as to make it easier for governments to show that existing 
restrictions on competition are in the public interest.  This can be called ‘reform 
dilution’ because it involves deliberately foregoing some efficiency benefits in 
order to safeguard other goals (see Argy, 1999).   
There are various ways the PIT can be amended to achieve the desired result.  
Quiggin (1998:17-19) suggests restructuring of the onus of proof to take ‘explicit 
account of all the criteria set out in the CPA s.1(3) as well as any other relevant 
factors, including losses to employees through reductions in wages and increases 
in work intensity’.  Less ambitiously, the Federal Government has foreshadowed 
some tinkering with the PIT.  The Deputy Prime Minister is reported to have said 
that ‘the public interest test needs to take proper account of the needs of rural 
communities and the costs of reform for regional communities’ (Lewis, 2001).   
The option of diluting the PIT, while technically viable, would add a lot of 
complexity to the process.  More importantly, it would almost certainly involve a 
significant sacrifice of efficiency if it made it too easy for governments to retain 
market-distorting devices such as restrictions on competition to advance their 
social goals — instead of looking for more cost-effective devices.   
The ‘exemption’ approach  
A second possible approach, potentially involving an even larger sacrifice of 
efficiency if carried too far, would be to legislatively exempt a wide range of 
activities from the provisions of NCP (as is already done for most pharmacists).  
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Such an approach would side-step the need for rigorous, objective and transparent 
cost-benefit analysis.  There would therefore be a risk that reform would be 
suppressed merely to satisfy vocal vested interests.  Moreover, like the reform 
dilution approach, it would involve employing a market-distorting instrument.   
That said, there may be a case for excluding from NCP such areas as the 
provision of health and education.  Apart from being socially sensitive, these are 
sectors where competitive markets do not always work well — for example, where 
consumers are not adequately informed and there are high transaction costs 
involved in acquiring the necessary information.   
The ‘reform with smoothing’ approach 
A third possible response would be to leave the PIT as it now stands and address 
the equity and environmental concerns associated with competition policy through 
direct budgetary means.  This would mean providing special assistance in addition 
to generally available assistance measures (such as those administered by 
Centrelink).  The additional assistance need not be of the income support variety, 
nor need it be solely ‘compensatory’ in its intent.  It can include what the OECD 
has called ‘active social policies' which seek to encourage a creative change in the 
behaviour of assistance recipients (for example, inducing them to move to where 
the jobs are or to enhance their skills or gain some work experience).  Such active 
policies may include for example: adjustment assistance, expenditure on regional 
infrastructure, equal opportunity measures and active labour market programs 
(such as wage subsidies, training, improvements in job placement machinery and 
intervention to promote welfare to work).  Active policies are socially more 
rewarding in the long term because they get at the root cause — market inequality 
— and eventually reduce the need for passive welfare.  They are also 
economically more efficient (OECD, 2001; Forsyth, 1999; Argy, 1999) 
Such an approach to economic reform can be called ‘reform with social 
smoothing’ because it seeks to safeguard wider community values through the 
most efficient and effective means available, while maintaining the momentum of 
economic reform.  It may require higher taxes and, where the social expenditure is 
of a capital nature and the gains are likely to be shared by future generations, some 
additional net government borrowing.  If sensibly designed, such fiscal devices are 
superior to restrictions on competition on many counts.  They are likely to involve 
much lower efficiency costs.  They can be used to facilitate structural adjustment.  
They allow the burden of costs and benefits to be more equitably controlled and 
targeted.  And they are generally more transparent and accountable. 
There is nothing in the Competition Principles Agreement that precludes 
governments from spending more money on social assistance (of the passive or 
active kind).  Despite globalisation, governments still have adequate powers of 
fiscal intervention if they choose to use them.  However reliance solely on this 
fiscal approach to correct the imbalance between efficiency and equity may 
require a more flexible medium term government stance on revenue, borrowing 
and spending than is now the case at either state or federal level (Argy, 2001).   
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Conclusions 
The paper has focused on three common criticisms of NCP 
 
• that the democratic legitimacy of the process is questionable;. 
• that NCP is built on a false premise that increased competition necessarily 
means increased efficiency; and  
• that efficiency is given too much weight relative to other community goals. 
 
Although the subject is complex and does not lend itself to simple 
generalisations, the paper has expressed certain views which can be summarised 
as follows. 
Legitimacy of the process.  Concerns about the democratic legitimacy of NCP 
processes have been allayed as a result of recent changes in modus operandi.  To 
go further and give the states much greater discretion would run the risk of 
destroying the integrity of the cooperative agreement.  However there is a need for 
greater consistency and fairness in the treatment of different groups and sectors.   
Competition and efficiency.  Although it is too early to assess the specific 
efficiency effects of NCP, economic theory and experience with other 
competition-promoting reforms both suggest that, provided adequate attention is 
given to externalities and adjustment costs, the long term winners from NCP will 
outweigh losers, thus meeting the usual economic efficiency test.   
Nevertheless economists who question the efficiency gains of competition 
policy have two important messages for policy makers.  First, they should not start 
with a universal presumption that competition necessarily improves economic 
efficiency: this needs to be demonstrated on a reform by reform basis.  Secondly, 
competition policy often needs to be complemented by other policies (for 
example, to facilitate adjustment and minimise transitional costs) if it is to achieve 
its maximum potential for efficiency.   
The imbalance between efficiency and broader community goals.  The paper 
has argued that the present Public Interest Test (PIT) is currently weighted too 
much in favour of competition and efficiency.  It does not give anything like 
comparable weight to other dimensions of wellbeing such as equity.   
Governments may wish to correct this imbalance.  If so, one viable response 
would be to amend the PIT to put all criteria on a more equal footing (although 
complete equality of treatment would not be practicable).  A second possible 
response could be by way of legislative exemptions.  Both these approaches have 
efficiency costs.  A third response would be to smooth undesirable social effects, 
preferably through ‘active’ social policies.  This would be the most effective and 
efficient way to achieve the desired social outcomes.  However the third option is 
only viable if governments are prepared to give themselves enough medium-term 
fiscal flexibility to finance the social assistance and adjustment packages.   
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